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Legal Regulation of Accounting
By Frederick S. Fisher, Jr.

At the present moment there is a definite, articulate, movement
to control and regulate, either by statute or otherwise, the present
methods of auditing corporate statements. This much is clear.
But any such movement must, of course, be coordinated with
certain legal rules already worked out by the courts of this coun
try. The question is thus at once presented: ‘ ‘ Do there now exist
any legal rules governing accountancy? ” If the law, as developed
by the decided cases and other authorities, now presents a com
plete and adequate system of control, there is no need for a
required or uniform technique of accountancy. But if this is not
the case, one must then attempt to analyze precisely where the
control by the law is incomplete and precisely where it is necessary
to develop further principles and standards.
I

To understand fully the significance of any judicial case or
authority, as well as its bearing upon the subject of accountancy,
it is necessary in the first instance to consider the characteristics
and general technique of the two sciences. Only by grasping this
background, historical if you will, may one fully appreciate the
significance of the presently decided cases. It is only by compre
hending legal technique that one may intelligently consider the
assertion later to be made that there is in essence a presently
developed law of accounting.
The common law of England, which has been adopted in great
measure by the courts of this country, had its origin in the eleventh
or twelfth century. Since that time the number of judges and
the number of reported cases, the principles and rules of law de
veloped, and the complex interweaving of various social and
economic factors have resulted in a tremendous and overwhelming
body of law which, because of its very size, is slow and ponderous
in its movement and in its ability to reflect the contemporary and
almost daily changes of the society in which it acts.
The profession of accountancy, on the contrary, is of a more
recent origin. Perhaps the first accounts were the statements of
the Roman grain merchants and Greek bankers; perhaps the first
9
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development of clean accounting principles came into existence
with the Lombard loans floated by the Medici dynasty. In any
real sense of the word, however, it would seem that the account
ing, voyage by voyage, of the British East India Company is
a more accurate point at which to say that accountancy in the
modem sense originated. At all events, the science of accounting,
as well as the art, became an important and significant profession
not much more than a hundred or so years ago. Within the last
hundred years however, and especially within the last fifty years
in the United States, the profession of accounting has grown
enormously. The complexities of business, the rapid develop
ment of our large industries and the tremendous expansion of com
mercial activity throughout the world have made it obligatory to
develop a more or less uniform method whereby business condi
tions might with some degree of intelligence be reported.
When one considers these divergent developments of law and
accounting it is not surprising to see that the art of accountancy
has progressed much more rapidly and has been much more
sensitive to the needs and requirements of a particular generation
than has the law. One may say with some degree of accuracy
that the law is slower moving than is accounting. The principles
today developed by accountants will be adopted by the law to
morrow. However, during the past twenty or thirty years, there
has been decided a surprisingly large number of cases, which, for
the most part, take the more fundamental rules of accountancy
and crystallize them into rules of law. What formerly was a
matter of professional ethics now has become a matter of legal
obligation. In many large sections of accountancy there is no
longer room for debate between accountants as to proper methods
of procedure. Such debate has become academic and of theoreti
cal interest only. The law has adopted what has seemed to it
the sounder rule and has terminated the matter. When the files
have been closed by a decided case it then behooves the account
ant to put aside the debate, the alternative practices advocated
by various members of his profession, and to adhere solely to the
rule of law laid down by the courts.
When once the law has set forth its recognition of a particular
rule of accounting practice, a new process then comes into prac
tice. The lawyer will take the decided case, study it, analyze it
and develop certain secondary rules from it which he feels will also
be adopted by courts using the same technique, the same logic,
10
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the same assumptions which were used in the case first decided.
It would seem, therefore, that we have a curve in spiral form,
a curve which never closes but always expands. The accounting
profession views the needs of the day, the ethics that are practised
by the community, the ethics that should be practised by the
community, and, from a consideration of all the factors available
to it, decides that a certain procedure is proper. Certain of its
members, however, decide that in logic and good conscience the
rule should be otherwise. Sooner or later, depending upon the
magnitude of the point, on its importance to some property inter
est, a case is brought into the courts of law and argued. Account
ing experts are brought in to testify as expert witnesses; reason and
logic are brought to bear on the problem; social and economic re
quirements as well have their sway. After all these considerations
(depending on the astuteness and zeal of counsel) have been dis
cussed, the court then lays down its rule. The dissenters among
the accountants are then to a greater or lesser degree silenced on
this precise point. Perhaps the secondary rules developed may or
may not accord with sound accounting practices; whether or not
they do is often dependent on the ability of counsel to present a
proper and persuasive argument based on considerations of public
policy and business necessity. At all events a “ basing-point ”
has been developed, a line begun, and, for better or for worse, the
system of precedent-making and case-matching has been inaugu
rated anew.
II
Now, having considered what is meant by the phrase “The law
frequently adopts rules of accountancy and crystallizes them into
rules of law, ” it is necessary to analyze yet another factor—does
the law consider problems of accountancy from the point of view
that accountants employ? That this problem is not one of theo
retical interest only should be quite clear. An illustration may,
however, be in point.
In accord with modern business practice we may expect to see
and, in fact, do see, the stockholder and his interest playing the
most spectacular rô1e. If the stockholder has been given errone
ous or misleading information, such conduct is at once written
up in the daily press with great furor. There are, however,
various other interests which are equally significant if not more
vital to the commercial well-being of the community. In addition
11
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to the stockholder there are the banker, the trustee of an estate,
the various governmental agencies, such as insurance commission
ers, the lender of short-term credit (perhaps to be distinguished
from the lender of long-term credit) and many other interests,
either actually or potentially in conflict. The importance of this
consideration should be clear. One particular report, even
though “accurate,” may not begin to satisfy the inquiries of two
different interests. The lender of short-term credit has no interest
in the manner by which a company has accumulated its surplus—
so long as there are sufficient assets capable of being levied upon
he is well pleased. The purchaser of a long-term debt is, on the
other hand, vitally interested in whether his company’s surplus
has been “manufactured” by a reduction of stock or has in fact
been earned. Again, the bank examiner may have a strong need
to know whether or not there are outstanding any contingent
liabilities, while the trustee of an estate invested in the stock of
such a bank might have only a minor interest in such fact. Exam
ples may be multiplied to show that accounts adequate for the pro
tection of one interest may be wofully lacking as soon as another
interest becomes involved.
While up to the present there seems to have been no accurate
discussion of this precise point, it seems safe to say that the ac
countant considers the interests of his client in the first instance,
limited perhaps by certain outstanding principles of public repre
sentation, and then considers his job well done. It seems equally
safe to state that the law has been primarily interested in the point
of view of those persons who advance credit to the accounting
concern. The majority of cases that have been found to consider
points of accountancy have contemplated them from the point of
view of the money-lender. Has he lent money on the faith of an
erroneous certificate or other statement?
The rules of accounting laid down by the courts are, therefore,
for the most part biased or prejudiced rules. It seems fit to
consider what cognizance both lawyers and accountants should
take of this problem. While it may be the case that no “true”
picture can be presented of a contemporary enterprise, it may not
be fallacious to assert that two pictures, from two angles, will
give a more accurate and uncolored presentation than either alone.
Certain it must be that this problem can no longer be ignored by
either profession, when it is common knowledge that one set of
financial statements will reach the investor about to sell stock, the
12
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bondholder about to foreclose his mortgage and the banker about
to consider his loan. The question of legal liability, if the forego
ing analysis be correct, is only a short step forward. At least one
method of attack is, of course, immediately suggested, namely,
that of liability for a misrepresentation of fact made with knowl
edge and relied on to the plaintiff’s detriment.
In view of the foregoing discussion, two propositions are sub
mitted as being derived from the principles stated:
(1) All existing legal cases that consider problems of account
ing should be carefully analyzed and, where necessary, discounted
if it appear clear that too much stress has been laid on the position
and point of view of the creditor.
(2) The accounting profession should consider that the same
document will in all probability be used for comparatively oppo
site purposes and that these documents should therefore be
constructed with that contingency in mind. Where it is im
practicable to furnish several sets of accounts, careful and legible
notations should be made of any facts which may unduly color
the statement if read from one angle rather than another.
It is appropriate to consider next the rules of law applicable to
accountants and the rules of law applicable to accountancy.
The considerations to be watched for have been indicated, viz:
the slowness of the law and the probability that both professions
overemphasize particular interests.
III
In the law of accounting as elsewhere one should start with basic
principles of honorable conduct. For the sake of clarity an at
tempt has been made to reduce these principles to stated theorems
which will serve to center attention at the proper places.
1. The duty of an auditor is to convey information, not to arouse
inquiry.
This principle was laid down in 1895 by Lord Justice Lindley
when he delivered his opinion in the case of London and General
Bank (reported in [1895] 2 ch. 673). In speaking of the ways by
which an accountant could audit a statement with apparent hon
esty and yet succeed in concealing unfavorable probabilities
and financial conditions from his readers, his lordship observed
that
“ A person whose duty it is to convey information to others
does not discharge that duty by simply giving them so much
13
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information as is calculated to induce them, or some of them,
to ask for more. Information and means of information are
by no means equivalent terms. . . . The duty of an auditor
is to convey information, not to arouse inquiry, and although
an auditor might infer from an unusual statement that some
thing was seriously wrong, it by no means follows that ordi
nary people would have their suspicions aroused by a similar
statement.”
The sophisticated observer of the recent business practices might
be at a loss to reconcile them with this clear and forthright state
ment of professional standards. At all events, the statement
quoted above seems axiomatic and in need of no further elabora
tion. The circumstances to which it might with facility be ap
plied are, on the other hand, so numerous that any attempt to
illustrate must be beyond the limits of this discussion.
2. An account which states only facts may nevertheless be erro
neous, and therefore the basis for legal action, if it combines those facts
in a misleading way.
The leading case on this subject is so recent that a mere men
tion of its name should serve to recall its facts. In the case of
Rex v. Kylsant (decided by the court of criminal appeal in 1931)
it was held erroneous to state that a company had earned an
average income over a period of years when in fact the company
had earned tremendous profits during the boom years of the war
and had earned little if any profits thereafter. The court there
stated with convincing candor that “a document might be false
not only by reason of the facts actually stated in it, but also by the
implication which a reader would draw from it.” To be sure, the
basis of the decision was the authority of an old English statute;
this fact, however, only strengthens the conclusion that an
English court will be eager to seize upon such laxity and such
indifference and equally eager justly to punish it whenever it may
arise again. A very interesting critique of this case was published
in The Journal of Accountancy in January, 1932. It is inter
esting to note that the learned author of that comment considered
that “the very fact of resort to average is a red flag to the cau
tious.” It is safe to say that only the most sophisticated would
have so considered it in the halcyon days before 1929. Further
more the statement quoted assumes, without too much justifica
tion , that financial statements are only for the intelligently cautious.
3. An accountant may not certify as a fact true to his own knowl
edge that a financial statement is in accord with the books of account
where such a declaration is false.
14
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As Chief Judge Cardozo pointed out in Ultramares v. Touche
(255 N. Y. 170) an accountant is not allowed to be guilty of reck
less misstatement or of an insincere profession of an opinion.
While he may be relieved from any liability if he has been guilty
of an “honest blunder,” he is not necessarily “bound to be a de
tective or to approach his work with suspicion or with a foregone
conclusion that there is something wrong.” To quote the words
of Lopes, L. J., in the Kingston Cotton Mill case, decided in 1896,
([1896] 2 Ch. 279), “he is a watch dog but not a bloodhound.”
In short, an accountant’s work is more than that of a mere
bookkeeper.
While there are other ramifications of these principles, it is
submitted that a compliance with the spirit as well as with the
letter of the foregoing three principles would be sufficient to
keep an accountant free from any liability which might otherwise
arise from his acts. Perhaps it might be advisable to state one
further caution to the effect that a true observance of the second
principle above listed may be had only when the accountant bears
in mind the various points of view which may be brought to bear
upon his statements. What may be a clear and careful presenta
tion of the facts from one point of view may not necessarily be so
from another.
From these fundamental and basic principles governing the
acts of accountants, it is a short step to a consideration of the
rules of law laid down for the accounts themselves.

IV

The principles governing the actual setting forth of the financial
statements, at least so far as the law has considered them, are in
reality no more than a detailed development of the foregoing.
While one may glibly state that the accountant should strive to
set forth a true picture of the condition of the enterprise for which
he is accounting, that does not add to the discussion.
In the first place, one meets again the problem of the point of
view from which the statements will be considered. An example
may serve to clarify. It is uniformly stated that a bank is not
entitled to include as cash on hand money which it holds tem
porarily on bailment or on trust, purely for the purpose of making
a good showing as to current assets. As was pointed out in
U. S. v. Peters (87 Fed. 984), one can not have “cash on hand”
if there be an agreement to return the money at a later date.
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Suppose, however, the transaction were such that a court would
leave the parties in the position in which it found them. Would
the fact that a suit could not lie be sufficient to allow an account
ant to include such funds as cash on hand? In a case as clear as
this the commercial probability that the accounting enterprise will
refuse to return the borrowed funds is practically zero. There
fore one may say that the accountant can not rely on the legal re
lations between the parties, and in fact the law itself recognizes
the part played by this factor of commercial probability.
It is a task beyond the endeavor of this article to consider all,
or even a large proportion of the decided cases on accounting.
An attempt has been made merely to indicate a few salient cases
or lines of authority which illustrate the several propositions sub
mitted ; for a more thorough collection of cases, the reader is re
ferred elsewhere. [An article by Messrs. Berle and Fisher in
Columbia Law Review, 1932, page 576, presents many legal cases
which support the theorems here advanced.—Editor, J. A.]
1. Financial Statements must clearly indicate the quality of the
items included.
Perhaps the most striking examples of quality occur in con
tingent items and capitalized expenses. As to the first, a bank
examiner may be vitally interested in the amount of notes on
which an accounting bank is guarantor; the lender of funds for
thirty days to an industrial organization may have comparatively
little interest in any contingent liability of his debtor. It is true
that the law conventionally recognizes as contingent all claims
that depend upon the occurrence of a future event other than the
mere (inevitable) passage of time. Yet from a commercial point
of view one may separate contingent liabilities in accord with
three characteristics. They may be classified according to the
probability that they will mature; according to the time when, if
ever, they mature; or according to the characteristics they will
have when they have matured into claims which the enterprise
may or may not have to satisfy. It is submitted that the matter
is largely one of degree—the more complete the financial state
ment, the more will remote and possible claims be included. So,
while an account for the benefit of a stockholder might adequately
portray the quality of the company’s liabilities if there were in
cluded the “actuarial value” of the company’s liability as guar
antor, nevertheless, if the same account were for the benefit of
a bank comptroller, definitely interested in all possible liability of
16
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a bank, it is safe to say (and there is legal authority which asserts)
that the account would be inadequate. Thus it may be con
cluded that the degree of commercial probability plus the interests
viewing the account must both be considered in deciding whether
or not the quality of any particular item warrants inclusion in a
financial statement.
As to the second item considered under this heading of “qual
ity,” viz. capitalized expenses, it is frequently said that any
enterprise may show a profit by charging off its mistakes to capital
and its profits to income. The cases so far indicate a mixed test
depending on reasonableness and hindsight for its effect. If a
particular expense in fact proved advantageous then it was proper
to capitalize it, provided the amount was a reasonable one. One
may find some assistance in approaching the problem if one con
siders a comparison here to the question of contingent liabilities.
Just as the problem of determining what liabilities, whether con
tingent or not, should be included rests primarily on judgment as
to where to draw lines between a capitalized hope and a capitalized
legal obligation, just so does a consideration of capitalized ex
penses rest on where to draw the line between capitalized hopes
and capitalized commercial (or economic) fact. One may indeed
say that the problem is one of deciding where, in the period of
gestation of a transaction from thought to profit (or loss) in the
bank, to draw the line. So it has been held unnecessary from
the point of view of a creditor to include an unliquidated contract
claim against the accounting company as one of its debts. The
basis of this rule is that the contract was not yet performed and
was, therefore, contingent. This liability seems, however, more
imminent than that of a guarantor of a note—which was required
to be listed in Cochran v. U. S. (157 U. S. 285). Yet a promise to
pay out a portion of future profits, if any, has been held to be an
outstanding obligation. Here the interests of a prospective pur
chaser were involved, and so, a shift of emphasis was natural.
This latter case (William v. Beltz, 30 Del. 360) is one of the few
that recognizes the importance of the point of view in consid
ering the adequacy of a financial statement. Thus it appears that
the law, while recognizing that the enterprise of today must incur
large expense preliminary to beginning operation, refuses to allow
the hopes and expectations of the accounting party to control the
accounting—the quality requisite is one of commercial fact, not
introspective, wishful thinking.
17
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In summary, then, of the first theorem it may be rephrased as
follows: Where the quality of any fact or negotiation is such that
it materially affects the commercial standing of the accounting
enterprise, from whatever point of view, the law will require such
fact or condition to be shown. And it is implicit in this state
ment that sound commercial experience shall govern any line of
probability which it may be necessary to draw.
2. All items on a financial statement should state the degree
of interest held in them (whether ownership or otherwise) by the
accounting enterprise; or, in the alternative, all items deviating from a
clearly recognized and known standard should be clearly indicated
as deviations.
This point considers primarily the creditor. Can he in fact seek
satisfaction from those items which are listed on a balance-sheet
as assets? The law has proceeded quite far along these lines.
For example, it has been held bad accounting to list as a current
asset items in which the accounting company had only a lessee’s
interest—the theory being that a creditor could not in fact avail
himself of such merchandise and would, therefore, be misled to his
injury. And again the problem of interest, coupled of course with
that of quality, appears in consolidated accounts. Thus suppose
that a holding company controlling three subsidiaries received
income from one subsidiary while the remaining subsidiaries were
operating at a loss. This at once raises the problem whether the
holding company may or may not pay dividends to its stockhold
ers. If the attributes of interest and quality are considered the
solution is brought nearer.
3. Items listed on a financial statement must be valued in accord
with some well-recognized scheme of valuation, and, if extraneous
facts warrant it, there should be included alternative bases of valua
tion.
It is currently maintained that accountants are not concerned
with valuation as such. True it may be that accurate valuation
is an ideal, perhaps unattainable. Yet to the extent that the
accountant, by professional standards or by force of law, considers,
for example, depreciation or reserves for uncollectible notes and
accounts, to that extent he must and does consider valuation, and
to that extent the law has entered the field.
In considering this problem of valuation there are several points
of interest. In the first place it is usually stated by the courts that
the accountant should generally observe a conservative valuation
18

Legal Regulation of Accounting
—namely a valuation at cost or market, whichever is lower.
The cases laying down this principle are, however, cases which for
the most part consider the interests of the banker or other lender
of credit and, as is natural, the courts tend to adopt what they
consider a more conservative view. In point of fact, however,
this view, while perhaps more conservative, is, nevertheless, still
a most liberal one. For example, if a debt is not paid when due,
the creditor seeking to enforce his claim against the assets of the
concern must rely on the proceeds obtainable from a forced sale
of those assets. It is common knowledge that a sale on liquida
tion will net less than the merchandise is in fact worth in a “handpicked” or trade market.
It appears from this simple illustration that there are at least
four tests of valuation. The valuation may be confined to cost or
to market, to the lower of these two, or to a more conservative test,
namely, the proceeds of a forced liquidation. It is quite obvious
that any one or even any two of these bases used in conjunction
may present a comparatively misleading and false impression.
For example, if the valuation is based on the test, cost or market,
whichever is lower, and there is a rapidly climbing market which
because of its inertia (if for no other reason) is practically certain
to continue rising until liquidation of the merchandise in the
ordinary course of business, it may be extremely misleading to
carry the inventory at cost although quite within the legal rules
so far laid down. And this leads us at once to the question of
whether or not a cause of action based on a misrepresentation
will arise when the accountant uses too conservative a test of
value, as well as when he employs too optimistic a test.
Another point of interest in valuation is that the cases, still
considering the interests of the creditor, require that any reserve
for depreciation or other loss in value should be clearly identified
with the particular assets so adjusted.
From this discussion of the principles of valuation it is found
that it is obligatory, to present a true picture of the facts, to
consider the commercial probability of receiving precisely what
particular items are said to be worth. In guarding against a mis
representation of value one must consider not only the point of
view but also the effect on value of various probable occurrences
such as a forced liquidation, a continued business depression, or a
probable advance in prices due to recent climatic or industrial
changes. It may be as misleading to carry goods at cost if the
19
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market has permanently risen (due perhaps to a crop decimated
by hurricanes) as it would be to carry them at cost when “the
bottom has dropped out of ” the market, due perhaps to a financial
panic. Note that similar problems arise in considering fixed
assets.
4. The standards of the accounting profession should wherever
possible be followed by the practising accountant.
Little by little the adjudicated cases are citing accounting
authority as a basis for their decisions. So long as there exists an
independent and impartial body of accountants it seems only just
and expedient that their impersonal ruling should be followed as
far as is possible. Such a rule of law makes at once for flexibility
and for progress.
5. Wherever financial statements are presented covering more than
one period, the basis of accounting should be identical for all periods,
unless any deviation in practice or any variation in accounting
method is plainly disclosed.
This subject as yet has not been dealt with by the law. It is,
however, presently a matter of serious discussion by accountants.
And in fact the New York stock exchange in its statement on
investment trusts (April, 1931) strongly urges that such trusts in
their reports call attention to any change of method or to the use
of more than one method during an accounting period. Its jus
tice seems obvious—so long as there are periodic accounts for
periods less than the life of the enterprise, the instinct of everyone
interested in ascertaining the condition of the business is to com
pare a series of such accounts. One hopes thereby to have discov
ered not merely the present condition of the enterprise, but the
trend of its development. Obviously a change in apparent de
velopment can be manufactured by simply changing the method
of accounting. If, for example, the rate of depreciation is changed
from 10 per cent in 1930 to 5 per cent in 1931 a company may
well earn more profits in the latter year, although in point of fact
its operating income had seriously declined. These considerations
raise a pretty question of law. If one accept the idea that the
allocation of income and expenses to one or another account lies
largely in the discretion of the management, there is no legal basis
for saying that any account is inaccurate. However, the fact re
mains (compare Rex v. Kylsant) that such a change in accounting
method will result in a wholly misleading impression to be derived
from the combined or comparative statements. It is strongly
20
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urged at this point that there is an implied representation that in
the absence of a notation to the contrary the method of accounting
remains unchanged. Certainly, in view of the fact that the
commercial and economic world as a body inevitably compares the
successive series of accounts issued by the large corporations, it
must be accurate to say that accountants are aware of the use to
which their statements will in part be put. This certainly seems
to suggest that people who render accounts hold out that their
successive accounts are on a comparable basis unless otherwise
specifically stated. The argument is stronger where, in the first
instance, a series of accounts are asked for, as when a bank re
quests a set of statements for the past four years as a basis for
making a loan. From these facts alone there may be spelled out
an understanding that for these periods at least the accounts were
kept upon a comparable system and were, therefore, capable of
being used to determine with some degree of accuracy the trend
of the business.
A sixth point, not yet sufficiently thought through to be made a
theorem, but of sufficient importance to mention here, is briefly
this: if the customary business cycle is recurrent every third year,
and the accounts are rendered yearly, to what extent should this
factor be indicated? If a layman, unfamiliar with this cycle,
were to be shown three income statements he might suppose that
the company had embarked upon an unprecedented wave of pros
perity, when in point of fact, it was more or less in the commer
cial “doldrums.” If statistics are adjusted for seasonal changes,
why should not accounts be? They can at least indicate that fact.
By way of a summation of the first half of this article several
points may be outlined:
1. The accountant, by virtue of his recurrent and ever-in
creasing activity, is in touch with the daily needs of the com
munity. Because of this and other factors he is able to reflect,
almost day by day, the changed philosophy of accounting as well
as the changed requirements and needs of the community in which
he acts.
2. The law, because of its longer life and its greater size, is
slower to move. It reflects tomorrow what the business commu
nity needs and attains today; case by case it builds up a body of
law to answer the needs of the community.
3. The law does, however, accept and adopt the rules and
precepts of the accounting profession as they are presented to it
21
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for decision. This process is comparatively slow because of
several factors:
(a) All problems of accounting are not presented to the courts
as soon as they arise;
(b) Only a selected few of the many problems that may or do
involve the law of accounting ever arrive before a court.
(c) When the cases that eventually arrive in the courts are
finally presented for adjudication it is often a matter of
years before a decision will be handed down.
4. Yet even at the present moment it may be said with some
degree of safety that the law has adopted a comparatively large
number of accounting rules and accounting conventions, and, in
some instances, has considered and rejected other accounting
principles, and that there is, therefore, a body of case-law from
which we may elicit a set of theorems in a very real sense equiva
lent to “principles of the law of accounting.”
5. To a surprising extent these theorems are in accord with
sound accounting standards. When they deviate from account
ing standards it is difficult to say which, in point of pure reason,
is the more correct.
6. The law and the practice of accounting are at present not
complete for several reasons:
(a) They often overemphasize one or another point of view,
leaving unconsidered other and equally important
interests.
(b) There are various gaps in accounting authority as well as in
judicial authority, which must, if accurate accounting be
desired, be both filled and regulated.
7. The tool most easily adopted by the law for reviewing ac
counting standards is the action for a misrepresentation of fact.
This must be considered from at least three angles:
(a) What interest is raising the question (and was his interest
within the consideration of the accountant when he
prepared the statements);
(b) Are the legal facts accurately stated;
(c) Have the commercial facts and the commercial probabilities
been accurately and thoroughly stated?
V
Examination of the first half of the problem shows that while
there is a body of cases concerned with the law of accounting, it is
22
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by no means a complete one. It therefore becomes necessary to
consider the arguments for and against a statutory system de
signed to supersede or to incorporate or otherwise to aid the present law of accounting. By way of setting aside unnecessary
objections, several points are first briefly discussed.
The accounting profession by itself can not effectively legislate
a system of accounting; nor is there any reason why it should
attempt so thankless a task. Its relations to the community,
as well as its differences of opinion, are excellent reasons against
such an act.
In the second place, whether desired or not, there is present
in point of fact a commercial system which has compulsory
auditing as a constituent part. Whether the audit be made by a
private bookkeeper employed by the management, by an inde
pendent auditor and expert, or by some person of rather indefinite
hue, the fact remains that business methods and the demands of
the community insist on some form of periodic accounting. The
treasury department, the New York stock exchange, the bankers,
the interstate commerce commission—all recognize the financial
and economic necessity of compulsory accounts. Factually
and theoretically we are practically over the dam. Nor can one
expect this well-reasoned and well-supported movement for com
pulsory accounting to die at one puff of opposition. It is present,
it is worthy, and should be aided with all available means.
At the outset it is clear that there are two lines of control open.
The law may adopt a set of standards, couched in comprehensive
language, and aiming to inform the accountant of general princi
ples whereby he may guide his actions. It may, on the other
hand, attempt a complete enumeration of all the precise acts which
he should and should not do, so that by a mere reading of the pre
scription , the accountant may govern his actions with perfect safety.
To enumerate the choice is in effect to chose. Only an omniscient
economist could attempt to prescribe detailed rules of conduct.

VI
In considering this problem a further fact becomes apparent.
The accountant, as a legal personage, has been slowly evolving
from the laity. He has become recognized as an expert somewhat
similar to the lawyer or the doctor. However, unlike these two
professions, the accountant and his acts are not to be considered
primarily from the point of view of the person who hired him.
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The lawyer or the doctor expects to be paid by his client or pa
tient; he expects, in the vast majority of situations, that his good
or bad advice will be restricted in its effect to the person who in the
first instance employed him. It is not so with the accountant.
True it is that he may be employed and paid by one man or one
interest, such as the management of a large corporation. Never
theless, the effect of his statements and of his accounts go far be
yond the person with whom he originally contracted. To be
sure, the New York court of appeals in the Ultramares case, its
most recent decision on the subject, decided that there would be
no liability for negligence on the part of an accountant toward a
third person, one with whom the accountant had no contractual
relations. The court there pointed out that liability for negli
gence, if established against the accountant, would extend to many
callings other than an auditor’s. While at first sight this case
might seem to dispose of the problem under discussion it is sub
mitted that, in view of the previous discussion, the calling of an
auditor differs so markedly from the callings of other professional
men that the case may well be limited in its application. It seems
clear, if one ask for thirty or so copies of a statement, that it will
be difficult to infer an intention to broadcast that statement to
the world. On the other hand, should one go to an accountant
and say, “Will you please audit my accounts so that I may pub
lish a statement of my financial condition in the Journal of Com
merce and the Wall Street Journal" it would be difficult to assert
that the accountant so employed would be at liberty to draw up a
set of reports as favorable as could be to the interest of the man
agement and, let us say, at the same time actively unfavorable,
misleading and inaccurate if considered by a stockholder—liabil
ity would seem a necessary consequence of such conduct. Yet,
because of ambiguous judicial rulings, a need for more legislation
on this and other problems in accountancy becomes apparent
and imminent.

VII
Moreover, in many states there already exist statutes requiring,
and to some extent regulating, corporate accounting. At this
point a brief consideration of these statutes may aid in the de
velopment of the discussion.
Accountants’ reports may themselves ground a cause of action
or they may be a mere adjunct to the successful prosecution or
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defense of a suit. The statutory law of Great Britain, as well
as of the United States, has enacted many provisions for safe
guarding the various interests that may rely on corporate financial
statements. These safeguards, both civil and criminal, are
intended to protect at least two large groups of persons who might
have cause to deal on a financial basis with a corporation—first,
the stockholder, actual or prospective, and, second, the banker,
or other person who advances credit on the faith of the statements
exhibited to him. In order adequately to cover these interests
the law has imposed restrictions on two other groups—directors
or other officers of the corporation, and accountants or auditors
employed by the corporation. Perhaps the English larceny act
of 1861 is the first important attempt to control the dissemina
tion of misleading corporate statements. This statute, and its
successor, section 274 of the companies act of 1929, fix the duty
to keep proper books and to present proper periodic statements.
These statutes have been followed by various enactments in
this country. Thus directors of national banks are under a
similar duty not to make false entries. And in New York sec
tion 665 of the penal law applies to directors or officers of any
corporation and defines the offense in terms similar to the English
statute. Another section of the penal law (section 952) provides
a penalty for misstatements concerning securities. While this
section has not as yet been invoked to attack a balance-sheet, it
seems to afford a convenient and useful mode of procedure.
Although many of the states have enacted statutes purporting
to regulate the financial statements of corporations, the paucity
of litigation under these statutes and their failure to provide de
tailed, uniform and scientific accounting methods would tend to
indicate that in most instances the statutory requirements may
be met by a most meager and superficial report and that only the
most flagrant falsified statement would justify the easier pro
cedure under the statute—easier in that damages are more cer
tain and more easily proven. The best-known of these statutes
is that enacted by Massachusetts. But here again appears an
overemphasis of one point of view—the liability imposed by this
statute is in the nature of a private remedy for a wrongful act
arising from a breach of duty owed to corporate creditors, and it is
created for their benefit alone.
In the legislative enactments of other jurisdictions there is little
similarity in the requirements imposed upon directors, even
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though about half of the states provide for some form of liability.
The statutes differ in what they consider misconduct and in what
they consider a proper penalty for such misconduct. The gen
eral tendency is to provide for so minimal a certificate or report
that a plea of lack of knowledge, or of intent to defraud, or of
reliance upon an accountant, will be sufficient to prove compliance
with the statutory requirements.
It is, of course, well-known that there exist at least two or three
extra-legislative requirements for keeping accounts. Thus the
interstate commerce commission and the various public service
commissions of the several states in their rulings and under
legislative authority stipulate the manner in which the several
enterprises coming under their jurisdiction shall keep accounts.
By these means there is prescribed to some extent a uniform
system of accounting. Another and still more unofficial source
of regulation is to be found in the provisions of the New York
stock exchange. The present exchange rules provide that all
listed corporations shall, before being granted the privilege of
listing, agree to furnish their stockholders with periodic state
ments. As yet, however, there are few requirements as to the
form or contents of these statements—so long as they have the
outward and visible attributes of accuracy the agreement has
been honored. It may perhaps be, if the arguments advanced
throughout this article be accepted, that an action for deceit will
lie against a director or an auditor for falsely representing to .the
exchange certain particulars concerning the financial condition
of the corporation in question.
As a prelude to further discussion of the problem of compul
sory accounting, then, several propositions may be stated:
(a) There is, in point of fact and of theory, a presently devel
oped obligation on the part of industry to prepare and to
furnish accounts.
(b) There has been some legal and some extra-legal experience
of compulsory accounting.
(c) This experience has shown that present-day requirements
are too indefinite and of too little strength (by way of
enforcement) to rest alone.
(d) The accountant must now be recognized as a professional
man in the nature of a public servant.
(e) The advantages, both to the profession and to the public,
of uniform accounting are too well-known and too obvious
to require further analysis.
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VIII

The problem now divides itself into three branches: Can any
rules of accounting be laid down by legislative enactment? As
suming that this is possible, will it lead to any degree of uniform
ity? Assuming that it is not possible, is there any other way of
accomplishing the purpose?
One thing at least is definite: it is suicidal to crystallize ac
counting technique at this point. Accounting knowledge is not
sufficiently adequate, nor sufficiently stereotyped, to undertake
the manifold risks which such an action would obviously entail.
This is not, however, the conclusion of the matter.
There are, as has been pointed out above, certain standards of
professional conduct and of accounting technique which are, or
which clearly ought to be, recognized as fundamentals of ac
countancy. This at once suggests an analogy to the methods
used by the common law—the facts of each particular case are de
cided in accord with fundamental principles, tempered by the
special circumstances of each case and the changing needs and
philosophy of the community.
Adopting this technique, it appears that it is not too hopeless
nor too dangerous a task to enact statutes which will lay down
broad standards of action in accountancy. While it is beyond
the scope of this article to phrase such a statute, it seems highly
probable that with a certain amount of expert thought, coupled
with an understanding both of law and of accountancy, a workable
comprehensive statute could be drafted. The advantages of
such a statute seem obvious: item by item, each individual case
would be decided on its merits without too great a handicap in a
pre-determined adherence to specific rules; there would be a
liberty of administrative action coupled with a publicity of ad
ministrative findings. Perhaps a most important advantage to
be had by such a method as this is that the administrative officers
would be able to, and would have to, use the knowledge and advice
of an accredited body of accountants—the work in all probability
could not be done without the assistance of such a group of tech
nical experts.
The statute could in fact go further than merely advocating
principles. It could with a degree of safety lay down certain
minimal requirements such as were discussed in the first part of
this article. The specific requirements so laid down would have
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to consider questions of quality, value, interest, point of view and
various others, such as uniform comparative accounts. In fact
the entire group of items customarily included on the several
financial statements should each have certain fixed and definite
tests required by statute. At the present writing it seems that
the statute should go further and provide that any accountant
who feels that the circumstances of a particular case are sufficient
to warrant the application of other and different tests should be
allowed to use such other tests provided he gives a full disclosure
of the general rule, of the special circumstances taking the case
out of such rule, and of the precise test or rule applied in lieu of
the statutory requirements.
As was pointed out by Frederick B. Andrews in his recent arti
cle, published in The Journal of Accountancy for November
of this year, this device at once raises a pretty question: Does
the notation of important information by means of a small and
practically illegible footnote fully comply with the conception of
full disclosure? The point made by Mr. Andrews is unanswer
able; one may add only the thought, so well expressed by Lord
Justice Lindley, that an accountant should dispense information,
not arouse inquiry. Furthermore it may be observed that it is
unavailing to state how one arrives at a result if the result arrived
at is meaningless.
IX

One final point should be briefly considered. Should such a
statute as the one here outlined be enacted by the federal govern
ment or by the several states? I submit that the only effective
way to acquire a uniform system of accountancy is via a federal
statute. To recommend state action would be to recommend
forty-eight probable variations in requirements—there can never
be a guaranty that even a so-called “uniform law” will be adopted
without change. Furthermore, the pressure of local politics and
jealousies, of state rivalries and competition render state action
extremely uncertain and untrustworthy.
If, then, the federal statute be considered the safer vehicle,
there appear only a few objections.
The first of these would seem to be the prohibitive cost of es
tablishing yet another governmental bureau. In considering
this cost it seems apposite to observe that the ancient proverb,
“in knowledge there is power,” is still in full force and effect.
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It is not necessary for a supertrust to fail in order to bring misery
and suffering to many an honest, intelligent and unsuspecting
investor. The set-up of modern business is such that its financial
statements are the mirror of reality—the door of the cave beyond
which we can not venture. And if the mirror be clouded, we re
main helpless. May it, therefore, be said in honesty that the cost
of assuring uniform, trustworthy, and accurate pictures of busi
ness condition and progress is so great that the savings of our
citizens should be gambled against it? Even now there is money,
and security, to be lost by relying upon mis-information. In
fact the present conception of many financial statements is that
“he who reads should run.”
The second objection concerns itself with the constitutionality
of such a proposed statute. While it is beyond the province of
this article to consider a question of such magnitude in detail,
a few observations should serve to clarify the problem. It is of
course clear that much can be accomplished if the proposed statue
be drafted in terms of a regulation of interstate commerce. It
might well be, however, that a more thorough control would be
obtained if uniform reports were required as an aid to a speedy
and efficient ascertainment of taxable capital and income.

The aim of this article has been to present the case for a further
step in the attainment of a uniform compulsory system of ac
countancy. That in fact there is compulsory accounting today
can not be seriously questioned. That uniform accounting has
many advantages, both for the profession and for the laity, seems
equally clear. It is therefore submitted, in view of the present
stage of development of the law of accounting, that the several
principles set forth should be supported and added to by appro
priate legislation, preferably federal. The wishes of the in
dividual person must be subordinated to the needs of the com
munity. The standards of the profession should receive the sanc
tion of the legislature. The rules of the existing law should be
recognized and furthered. And finally the interests of all who
may have occasion to make use of corporate accounts should be
thoroughly considered and protected.
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